“When and how will this war end?” I have been getting this question a lot lately, which has allowed me to gradually formulate a complete answer: This war will be long, and we can outline three points in time when it would be possible to talk about its end.
Peace or armistice
The first time we could discuss the war’s end will be when the warring parties stop fighting and the Russian army withdraws from Ukrainian territory. Perhaps this will be fixed by an armistice agreement or a peace treaty, or maybe (although highly unlikely), at some point, the Russian army will be ordered to turn around and withdraw, as it did in late March and early April when Russian troops quickly left the territory of Kyiv and Chernihiv regions without preconditions.
When could this happen? Either when one side defeats the other and forces it to sign an act of surrender, or when one side considers that the continuation of the war has far more to lose than losses of territory or image.
I see today that both sides are extremely far from these points. The Russian army did not prove incapable of achieving a swift victory in the first days of the war. By refusing to take Kyiv, Russia has shifted to a war of attrition, expecting to win at the expense of an advantage in quantity and quality of weaponry that will allow the slow displacement of Ukrainian forces and the destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure. There is one weakness in this logic: It is unclear what the endgame of the war could be other than the complete surrender of the Ukrainian army. What can Vladimir Putin recognize for himself (not for public opinion, which is ready to accept any event as a victory) as a triumph, as an achievement of the goal? So far, the Russian President has not directly answered this question. However, from his comparison of himself with Peter the Great (Occupation? Or return?), it is possible to construct a hypothesis that such a goal—the return of what used to belong to Russia—could be the occupation of the Mykolaiv and Odesa regions.
I am not prepared to say there can never be such a thing. So far, the Ukrainian army is suffering from a severe shortage of arms and ammunition; it is capable of stubborn defensive battles, but it cannot conduct an offensive. Defense drains strength and undermines morale. The scenario in which the Russian army stops its offensive at some point to rest and prepare for a new offensive seems quite realistic. At the very least, if Russian troops stop today, Ukraine will not have the strength or the capacity to attack. Since, for Putin, the price of human life is meager, and there is no public outcry against the war in Russia, Russia can wage a stop-and-go war for a very long time.
The Ukrainian authorities are facing a tough choice: The war is killing and crippling tens of thousands of people, destroying the economy, infrastructure, families, and the normal functioning of the state. If the war continues, there is no way to talk about returning to everyday life; we can dream about it, but we cannot do it. Perhaps, from the point of view of saving human lives and normalizing the life of the country, making a peace agreement with Russia (Minsk-3 or Brest-2) on the principle of ending the war in exchange for territory (in the expectation that after Putin leaves the Kremlin, Russia will return this territory to Ukraine) looks rational, but today Ukrainian society will not accept such a proposal and will not support whoever proposes it. Society’s position may change as the cost of continuing the war increases for each family. But how quickly this will happen, and whether it can happen as most Ukrainians demand peace at any cost, we do not know.
The possibility of a military victory for Ukraine at the current ratio of quantity and quality of armaments seems extremely unlikely. The Ukrainian army has no advantage in tanks and artillery, without which an offensive is impossible; no modern air defense capable of protecting the country from missile attacks from Russia; and no anti-ship missiles capable of keeping the ships of the Black Sea Fleet at a distance that would prevent them from attacking Ukrainian territory with missiles. Arms deliveries by Western countries are not able to change the situation qualitatively.
In short, Putin believes he can go on the offensive, while Zelensky thinks Ukraine can defend itself and prepare for an offensive—i.e., I do not see an end to the war any time soon.
Regime change in Russia
When and if the war in Ukraine stops, Ukraine will continue to live in constant tension, fearing a new invasion by Russia. If Ukraine dislodges the Russian army from its territory, Putin will want revenge. If the warring parties remain where they are today, Putin will continue to dream of Odesa. If Putin captures Odesa during this war, his dreams then will spread to Dnepr and Kharkiv. Without Vladimir Putin leaving political life, the threat to Ukraine from Russia will not go away.
We understand that sooner or later, this will happen. Putin is a biological being whose potential life cycle is not counted in centuries. He will be 70 years old this October. President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe ruled the country until he was 93, and Queen Elizabeth II continues to reign at 96 years old. Vladimir Putin’s parents lived 87 and 88 years. I don’t know about you, but the scenario of him being at the top of Russian power for another 15-20 years does not look unrealistic.
And that could mean that the war, cold at best, between Russia and Ukraine will go on all that time.
Change of narrative
We don’t know when Vladimir Putin will leave power. And we don’t see how the political transition will work out after that, which politician will be at the head of Russia and what policies he will pursue. But we know that while Vladimir Putin is in the Kremlin, his propaganda machine will work and warp the brains of Russians.
I assume that Putin will not agree to capitulate to the West even when Russia’s defeat in the hybrid war is evident to all. Consequently, he will not agree to the liberation of the entire territory of Ukraine seized by the Russian army and to the payment of compensation to Ukraine.