Fake holiday
On November 4, Russia celebrates a national holiday—National Unity Day. Perhaps the strangest holiday you can think of. According to the official version, November 4, 1612, was the day of the “liberation of Moscow from the Polish invaders.” However, historical documents do not support this version.
On October 22 (November 1, new style), 1612, the Russian militia took Kitay-Gorod by storm. (At the beginning of the 17th century, the difference between the Gregorian and Julian calendars was 10 days.) Kitay-Gorod is directly adjacent to the Kremlin, and at that time, this part of the city was surrounded by a separate fortress wall. Anyone slightly interested in Russia knows well that the Kremlin has always been the symbol of supreme power and the personification of Russia’s sovereign statehood. The capture of Kitay-Gorod is nothing more than an episode of the Vague Time (Smutnoe vremya). Only the release of the Kremlin can be seen as a significant event.
The “Polish invaders” were not Polish at all. Though some Poles were there, the bulk of the army that occupied Moscow were Russian under the leader of the Tsar-Imposter. It was a civil war. Nevertheless, “invaders” retreated to the Kremlin, which was immediately besieged. Then there was a pause. Neither side had sufficient resources to continue the hostilities. The besieged experienced severe food shortages. The besiegers did not have enough soldiers and powerful artillery to break through the walls of the Kremlin. At the same time, both sides knew that the army of the Polish prince Vladislav was coming to help those in the Kremlin.
The militia leadership decided not to wait for the arrival of the Polish army and offered surrender to the besieged. The primary condition was a guarantee of an unhindered exit from Moscow. The besieged, not sure that support would come quickly, officially surrendered on October 26 (November 5). The Moscow noblemen left the Kremlin on the same day, where they were kept as hostages. And the next day, October 27 (November 6), the besieged left the Kremlin and Moscow.
Thus, no more or less significant hostilities were fought between 22 and 27 October (between 1 and 6 November). And on October 25 (November 4), nothing happened at all that would be worthy of a simple mention.
This holiday has been established in Russia since 2005. At the same time, the holiday of November 7, the day of the October Revolution, was cancelled. The motivation of the Kremlin was obvious: At that time, the communists were still perceived as serious political opponents. Although in the elections to the State Duma in December 2003, they won half the number of seats in the lower house of parliament (52 versus 113), the Kremlin has not yet managed to consolidate a confident parliamentary majority. Since the collapse of the USSR, the day off on November 7 has been used by the communists as an opportunity to hold mass rallies throughout the country. The cancellation of this holiday made it impossible.
Question: Some people see the National Unity Day as a holiday (green line),
others see it as an extra day-off (blue line). In your opinion,
which of them are more? (FOM.ru)
The imitation nature of the holiday quickly became apparent to most Russians. Every year the share of those who treat this day as an additional day off is growing.
A friend whom he doesn’t want to meet
Vladimir Putin is so fond of his closest ally, the President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, that he refused to meet with him even on an essential matter. At the same time, it cannot be said that Putin refused the trip due to fear of COVID—on that day, he went to the occupied Crimea to open another monument there. Lukashenko publicly reprimanded Putin for not taking him with him, despite the request.
The meeting, held in the mode of a videoconference, was called “Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Union State of Russia and Belarus.” This integration entity has existed since 1999. This meeting was devoted to signing a package of 28 integration documents, which were positioned as a qualitative deepening of integration. Discussion of the package lasted more than three years. At some point, a large group of experts believed that integration and almost complete unification of state functions of the two countries would be the scenario that ensured Putin retains power after 2024. However, the Kremlin chose a much simpler option—a constitutional reform was carried out, within the framework of which the restriction of two presidential terms was lifted for Putin.
As a result, the set of signed documents turned out to be largely emasculated. In fact, we see the creation of uniform rules not through the adoption of supranational acts but through the signing of many bilateral agreements. The implementation of the 28 road maps signed by the presidents will require the preparation and signing of more than 400 intergovernmental agreements, said the Secretary of the Union State Dmitry Mezentsev.
The creation of a single parliament, which is provided for by the treaty on the design of the Union State, the formation of a single energy market, the unification of transport services markets and other vital issues, remained outside the attention of the meeting participants.
Who benefits more from a bad peace?
Russian Ambassador to Washington Anatoly Antonov said that Russian-American communication channels are gradually being restored.
“To date, we have established business relations through the security councils. Of course, we have never stopped contacts through the Foreign Ministry. Just two weeks ago, a large delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk visited here (in Washington) and held meetings with representatives of various structures of the United States. Chief of General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov met with his counterpart in Helsinki. Said the Russian ambassador, “All this suggests that channels of communication between the two states are gradually being recreated and restored.” [A few days ago, CIA Director William Burns visited Moscow—SA.]
According to the ambassador, U.S. agencies received a command to rebuild contacts with Moscow after the Biden-Putin summit in Geneva. “After the meeting between Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden, I managed to immediately visit the White House, the State Department, and I asked the question directly: ‘Tell me, please, you received direct commands that it is necessary to continue the interaction, to continue contacts between the relevant structures of the Russian Federation and the USA?’ It was enjoyable to hear that American agencies received such a command from the administration.”
The intelligence services of Russia and the United States have established good contact in information security; Moscow is taking advantage of Washington’s tips in this area, Antonov said. “We have found a good communication between the Kremlin and the White House, our special services are working on appropriate tips from the U.S. We send our inquiries to our American colleagues to find out who is acting against us from their territory. We insist that they were punished,” the diplomat said, without specifying what the American side’s reaction to these requests looks like.
I agree with the Russian proverb that “a bad peace is better than a good quarrel.” Undoubtedly, horizontal contacts between the state structures of the U.S. and Russia are necessary. But it seems that in terms of image, the Kremlin benefits from their expansion much more than the White House. For all the inconsistency of former President Trump’s policy toward Russia, the almost complete rejection of contacts symbolised tension in Russian-American relations. The United States spoke openly about Russia’s destructive actions (interference in elections, aggression in Ukraine, cyberattacks...) and insisted on a change in Russian policy. The approach of President Biden’s administration, in fact, draws a line under the past and intentionally or unintentionally indulges Putin.
Peace in Ukraine is not on the Kremlin’s agenda
The official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, stated that Russia refuses to continue the dialogue on peace settlement in the Eastern Ukraine within the Normandy format, even at the foreign ministers’ level. She said that Russia has still not received a reaction to its proposals on the final document of a potential. “It should reflect the state of the negotiation process, including the implementation of the decisions of the Paris summit of the Quartet on December 9, 2019, and new guidelines for advancing a Ukrainian settlement based on the Minsk agreements.”
Zakharova stressed that without a clear understanding of the possible results of such a meeting, it makes no sense to talk about the dates of its holding. “Our position is well known... Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov voiced it in an interview with the French Foreign Minister on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Rome. His calendar does not allow him to take part in the proposed ministerial meeting of the Normandy Four soon.”
Oil companies seek money from the budget
Russian oil companies have sensed the acceleration in inflation and have stepped up their pressure on the government to boost their profits.
Since 2019, Russia has had a special tax regulation of gasoline prices, called a damper mechanism. It sets a cap on the rise in gasoline prices within the country at the projected inflation level, thereby removing the link between domestic and world oil prices.
To calculate the damper, the Ministry of Energy compares domestic prices for refined products with the netback, the export alternative (the export price for a particular type of fuel minus transportation costs and taxes). If the netback is negative, the domestic price turns out to be higher than the export price, and then the oil companies pay a significant share (68% in the case of gasoline to the budget). Such a situation developed in 2020, when the total payments to the budget amounted to 400 billion rubles (about $5.5 billion). If the difference is positive, oil companies incur relative losses, and then the state compensates them for the same share. This situation developed in 2021, and budget payments for 10 months amounted to about 530 billion rubles ($7.3 billion).
After the crisis, the recovery of the Russian economy and the growth of road freight and passenger air traffic has led to an increase in demand for diesel fuel and aviation kerosene. As a result, the prices of these fuels began to rise, and the government had obligations to start paying compensation to airlines (which promised not to raise airfares). On the other hand, the rise in prices for these types of fuel led to a change in the production structure of petroleum products at refineries and a decrease in gasoline production. Prices for which began to rise immediately. This was the subject of discussion at a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak. The Deputy Prime Minister commanded to conduct an additional analysis of the operation of the fuel damper for gasoline and diesel fuel and consider the feasibility of adjusting it for 2022.
Let’s wait for the Russian oilmen to receive a weighty gift for the New Year! At least, no less weighty than last time. The last adjustment of the damper mechanism took place this past spring. Then the Russian oil companies achieved an increase in payments from the budget within the framework of the damper mechanism by 350 billion rubles ($4.8 billion) for 2021-2023. It’s worth mentioning that two-thirds of oil in Russia is produced by companies controlled by the government.
Navalny being tortured
The independent TV channel “Rain” (Dozhd”) released a report on the bullying that politician Alexei Navalny is subjected to in the prison colony. The report is based on interviews with two former prisoners who were in the same colony until recently. Both of them are currently outside Russia, and neither of them knew about the cooperation of the other with the TV channel.
Before Navalny arrived at the colony, a special division was formed, all of which lived in one barrack. (Communication between members of different divisions in Russian colonies is minimal). Each of them was instructed, and a total ban on any communication with Navalny was announced. The colony’s leadership issued an order “to make Navalny’s life psychologically unbearable.” It was forbidden to use physical violence against him, but any form of psychological pressure was encouraged.
During Navalny’s hunger strike, a prisoner with an allegedly open form of tuberculosis was put next to him. His illness turned out to be a staged one. Navalny was not allowed to sleep for the first three days after returning from the prison hospital—a prisoner put on the next bed made “different loud sounds” all night. When Navalny was in the hospital during a hunger strike, a film was shown in the colony on his birthday, in which the oppositionist is presented as gay.
Russian colonies are informally divided into “red” and “black” ones. In the “black” colonies, real power belongs to a narrow group of prisoners who determine the rules of conduct, ensure the maintenance of order, force all prisoners to give part of the money for “common needs,” and, through corruption, reach an agreement with the administration of the colonies on the principles of coexistence. In the “red” colonies, the administration holds all power in its hands; the administration monitors the behaviour of prisoners through their informants. The use of physical violence against prisoners by the administration is widespread and not punished.
Navalny was placed in the most “red” colony. Its level of cruelty impressed many prisoners who were in various colonies.
Saturday’s essay (subscribers only) will focus on the hot topic of Gaz, Gazprom, Europe.