March 15, 2022

Ray of hope?

On March 14, the head of the Russian delegation at the talks, an aide to President Putin, Vladimir Medinsky, said that “every day, without days off, negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation take place in the VCS (video-conferencing) format. This format saves a lot of time and money.”

On March 15, the advisor to the head of the office of the President of Ukraine, Alexei Arestovich, said that “now a fork in the road has been reached, and within a week or two, quickly, there will be a peace agreement, with the withdrawal of troops, with everything else <...> or we will agree shortly—a week, two, or then already by the end of May after another round.”

Information about the progress of Russian-Ukrainian negotiations allows us to hope that a political agreement will be reached that will stop the war. War, as you know, is started by generals and ended by diplomats when they sign a peace agreement or an armistice agreement. I will try to state my hypothesis. 

Since in recent days the talks between Russia and Ukraine have been taking place via video link without communication with the media, we can assume that the sides have stopped making ultimatum demands of each other and have begun to look for ways to bring their positions closer together. Each side has its rational arguments for reaching a compromise.

Why negotiate?

The Russian offensive has obviously lost momentum moving forward. It is time to replace the personnel, who are psychologically exhausted and overwhelmed, and possibly the combat equipment as well. If the Russian service members who participated in the offensive return to their places of permanent deployment, information about what happened in Ukraine will spread among the Russian population. Since the average Russian today knows nothing about the war, this could be a solid psychological shock and cause a drop in trust in the government, generally, and in Putin, particularly.

Given the Russian army’s exceptionally poorly organized military logistics, moving tens of thousands of soldiers in opposite directions along roads clogged with broken or abandoned military equipment will be tough. Moving the military equipment along these roads will be even more challenging. And most importantly, the Russian military has no Plan B except for massive bombing and artillery shelling, which destroys cities but does not ensure forward movement.

Moreover, the pressure of sanctions on Russia’s economy has been much more significant than expected, and the consequences, which can now be calculated, suggest their destructive nature. In short, the price of the war that Putin has unleashed is proving to be too high.

The Ukrainian army and Territorial Defense Force have demonstrated the ability to defend every meter of their territory confidently. The rise of national consciousness and patriotism keeps their morale at an all-time high. The loss of control of major cities is not perceived in Ukraine as a defeat or retreat, especially because the Russian authorities are not even trying to pursue any meaningful policy in the occupied territories.

Ukraine receives substantial assistance from the West financially, keeping its economy, budget, and money flowing, and its military fighting. However, the weaponry flowing into Ukraine allows for a defensive war, but it cannot help liberate the country from occupation and prevent further destruction. Every day of battle causes enormous damage to Ukraine, both material and psychological (loss of life, mass flight of citizens outside the country), and perhaps for President Zelensky (and the Ukrainian political elite), a humiliating and obscene peace treaty with Russia could be an acceptable price to pay for saving the integrity and stability of the country.

What might the compromise consist of?

Russia’s demands consist of 1) recognition of the annexation of Crimea, 2) recognition of LNR/DNR independence, 3) de-Nazification of Ukraine, and 4) demilitarization of Ukraine.

The most significant shift that has already taken place concerns the last point, the demilitarization of Ukraine. Ukraine has abandoned its aspiration to join NATO; President Zelensky admitted that NATO countries do not want this. In addition, Ukraine’s representatives have previously stated their readiness to enshrine the principle of neutrality. As they say, it’s just a matter of small things: Formulating a definition of neutrality and determining how Ukraine can obtain guarantees of its territorial integrity in the future.

On Tuesday, the Russian side was finally able to specify its demands for the de-Nazification of Ukraine. In practice, this can be realized by granting Russian status as the official language (at most, the second state language; at least, a regional one), with the possibility of education in Russian and the operation of Russian-language television. This group also includes demands to change Ukrainian laws infringing on the rights of the Russian-speaking population. Before the war, the position of the Ukrainian political elite on this issue was categorically negative, but today, in my opinion, we can expect a softening of the position here.

In my opinion, President Zelensky will not agree to recognize the independence of the LNR/DNR because this position will not find support in society. However, I entirely admit that Ukraine may agree to an extended transition period, during which the LNR/DNR would have a special status, with the obligatory restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine in this region. The key issues here are LNR/DNR borders and guarantees of cessation of hostilities. Both sides will have to make painful concessions in this direction and move firmly away from the declared starting positions.

On the issue of Ukraine’s recognition of the annexation of Crimea, I do not see the possibility of a compromise; however, it is not certain that Russia will insist on it. This demand was put forward as deliberately unacceptable so that its refusal could be exchanged for material concessions. For example, to restore water supply to Crimea through the North-Crimean Canal.

We know almost nothing about the starting negotiating position of Ukraine except that there is a demand to stop the war, withdraw Russian troops, and, most likely, compensate for damage. It seems that the latter point is the only stumbling block for Russian negotiators.

And if they disagree?

Everything I have written above is my hypothesis, which I cannot confirm from my sources. It is quite possible that I am mistaken in my analysis and that I need to read more carefully the message on the Kremlin website about the phone conversation between Vladimir Putin and European Council President Charles Michel. 

Vladimir Putin outlined the principal assessments of the ongoing negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian representatives to work out agreements, considering known Russian demands. At the same time, he noted that Kyiv was not seriously inclined to seek a mutually acceptable solution.

This message suggests that no significant progress has been made in the negotiations, and the pause in hostilities is due to the regrouping of the Russian military. And therefore, the war will continue. This is undoubtedly bad news. But I would like to remind you that diplomats end wars, which means negotiations will continue, and discussions will proceed along the same four lines. 

In the meantime

Meanwhile, the trial of Alexei Navalny is coming to an end. It took the court just a month to conduct all the necessary procedures formally. The Russian prosecutor’s office has announced its demand for a 13-year sentence in a strict-regime penal colony. Yet to come is the announcement of the verdict.

During the trial, the prosecutor’s office and the investigation could not present any evidence that Alexei Navalny had used the money collected from his supporters for his personal needs. It turned out that no money was ever transferred from the accounts of the companies that received donations to Navalny’s charges.

The testimony of four people the prosecutor’s office presented as victims did not help the prosecution. One of them transferred money to the account of Navalny’s organization, the details of which were known only to government agencies and were not publicly available. He wrote his statement to the prosecutor’s office the very next day. The second victim is a pensioner. During his testimony in court, he could not recall any details and often made statements that contradicted the testimony given during the preliminary investigation. Two other victims are under criminal prosecution, but they stated that they had no claims against Navalny during court hearings. 

Although the prosecution was unable to present evidence of Navalny’s guilt, in his statement, the prosecutor confidently stated that Navalny [and others] stole the funds received and disposed of them at their discretion. The prosecutor rejected the defense position that Navalny never received anything on his account since the money had been sent to the accounts of other FBK members or campaign workers—and they were members of the same organized group as Navalny, each member of which had a role to play. The prosecutor did not say why Navalny’s organization spent the money or how he profited from it. 

During Alexei Navalny’s last words, the audio feed was cut off many times, so journalists sitting in the neighboring room could not hear the whole speech or record it. Lawyers seated in the courtroom were forbidden by the court to use any technical devices.

The verdict will be announced in a week, on March 22.Alexei Navalny's comrades-in-arms disclosed information that the judge hearing the case repeatedly called the same person in the Russian Presidential Administration during the process. Now she will have time to hold detailed discussions with him.