In late August, another survey of Russian public opinion on economic issues was carried out on behalf of the NEST Centre. It found that more than a third of Russians openly support reducing military spending in order to increase funding for social programs. Current assessments of the economic situation remain moderately negative. Inflationary pressure is slowly increasing following the rise in petrol prices, but Russians are not prepared to openly blame the government. At the same time, three-quarters of respondents believe that the war is worsening the state of the Russian economy.
More than half of Russians (53 percent) describe the state of the Russian economy as ‘not great’, a share which has increased somewhat over the past two months as the proportion who assess it as ‘good’ has declined. Almost no respondents remain who are prepared to describe the state of the economy as ‘excellent’.
Forty-two per cent of Russians believe that the state of the economy has worsened over the past three months, while 16 percent say that the deterioration has been significant. Compared with the June survey, assessments have improved somewhat: the percentages who believe that the situation has not changed or has improved slightly have each risen by 3 points, to 35 percent and 12 percent respectively. This optimism looks unusual against the backdrop of the petrol crisis. Most likely, these fluctuations are within the margin of error and do not signal a shift towards improved perceptions of the economy.
According to Rosstat, petrol prices in Russia rose by almost 20 percent in the first eight months of 2026, compared with an overall increase in consumer prices of 4.7 percent. Many experts believe that this will inevitably affect the rate of inflation, and it appears that Russians have begun to feel the impact. The share of respondents who say that the cost of living places a heavy financial burden on them has risen to 35 percent, from 29 percent in April. At the same time, the share who say that the cost of living is not a problem, including those who think this may change soon, has fallen to 35 percent, from 42 percent in April.
However, these shifts have not affected how Russians assess the government’s performance on economic issues. Almost half of respondents (47 percent) still believe that its economic priorities are correct, while 35 percent disagree. At the same time, only 15 percent of respondents see positive results from the government’s policies, down from 19 percent in April. The share of respondents who say the government’s decisions have no effect on their families’ quality of life rose to 55 percent in August, up from 50 percent in February and 49 percent in both April and June. More than a third of Russians believe that the government creates new problems for them: 35 percent in August, 37 percent in June, and 33 percent in April.
Three-quarters of Russians assess the impact of the ‘special military operation’ negatively (surveys conducted in Russia cannot use the word ‘war’). Forty-six per cent say that it has had a strongly negative impact on the economy. Only 12 percent see a positive effect, and just 3 percent describe this effect as strongly positive. These figures have changed little compared with the June survey, which is unsurprising: the government cannot point to any improvements in the economic situation, while Vladimir Putin is speaking increasingly often about ‘certain difficulties’ and unresolved problems.
The August survey included two questions which were close to the limits of what is ‘politically permissible’:
In 2024–2025, federal budget spending under the ‘National Defense’ heading increased almost fourfold compared with the 2019–2021 level. Some consider this increase justified, while others believe that it would have been better to spend this money on healthcare, education, and pensions. Which of these views do you personally tend to agree with?
If you were responsible for deciding how federal budget funds should be allocated, would you currently agree to reduce defense spending in order to increase spending on healthcare, education, and pensions?
Most likely, some respondents tried to give politically ‘correct’ answers to these questions. However, even with this in mind, the results are difficult to ignore. The share of Russians who consider the fourfold increase in military spending justified slightly exceeds the share who believe that it would be more appropriate to direct budget funds towards social programs (48 percent compared with 43 percent). At the same time, firm supporters of increased military spending outnumber convinced supporters of greater funding for social programs, by 27 percent to 18 percent.
The suggestion in the second question that respondents take responsibility for reallocating budget resources from the war to social programs appears to have made them more cautious in their answers. More than half (52 percent) believe that the war requires sacrifices and did not agree with the proposal to reduce military spending. This group was divided equally between ‘definitely not’ and ‘probably not’, at 26 percent each. Just over a third of Russians (36 percent) believe military spending should be reduced to increase funding for social programs.
Many surveys show that residents of Moscow, older Russians (aged 55 and above), and pensioners tend to be more ‘hawkish’. Unexpectedly, a majority of young Russians (51 percent of respondents aged 18–39), housewives (56 percent), and respondents who are not in employment (49 percent) consider the increase in military spending unjustified. Russian housewives are the most ‘anti-war’ group: 47 percent are prepared to support cuts in military spending in order to increase funding for social programs, while 29 percent are opposed. Among young Russians aged 18–39, supporters and opponents of reducing military spending were almost evenly divided, at 45 percent and 43 percent respectively. The most consistent supporters of maintaining military spending were higher-income Russians, managers, and professionals: 55–57 percent opposed cuts, while 28–34 percent supported them.
Methodology
The nationwide survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews during the final ten days of August 2026 using a representative sample of Russia’s urban and rural population. The sample comprised 1,602 respondents aged 18 and over. The margin of error for a sample, at a 95 percent confidence level, does not exceed:
3.4 percent for indicators close to 50 percent;
2.9 percent for indicators close to 25 percent / 75 percent;
2.0 percent for indicators close to 10 percent / 90 percent;
1.5 percent for indicators close to 5 percent / 95 percent.