Supporting a war is "normal", helas

February 5, 2023

Although Dmitry Medvedev confidently stated that the nuclear powers did not lose conventional wars, anyone familiar with history knows this is false. The United States lost in Vietnam; the Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan. With a particular stretch of the imagination, the French war against Algeria, which ended immediately after France conducted its first nuclear test, can be assessed similarly. Of course, any historical analogies are of minimal value, and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine differs in many ways from all three of the above. But on the other hand, in each of these cases, a much more economically and militarily powerful country tried to impose a political system it desired on a weaker opponent. And the more powerful country failed each time, mainly because its public opinion stopped supporting the war. The most telling example is that of France, which formally won a military victory, defeating the rebel army by mid-1960. Nevertheless, in a referendum held in January 1961, 75% of the French voted for the independence of Algeria. In April 1962, 91% of the French approved the Évian Accords in a referendum, which gave Algeria independence.

Many observers are surprised by the high level of support for the war unleashed by the Kremlin against a neighboring country, but history tells us there is nothing strange about it. Foreign policy is rarely on the list of essential topics that society pays attention to; most people in any country consider international relations too distant, not affecting everyday life, and prefer to explicitly or implicitly delegate responsibility for decision-making in this area to the government. In 1959-1962, for example, two-thirds of the French supported General de Gaulle’s decisions and actions concerning Algeria, regardless of how military events unfolded or what statements the French President made.

In August 1965, 61% of Americans (according to a Gallup poll) believed that starting the war in Vietnam was NOT a mistake. From May 1966 to October 1967, it was about 50%, and only in February 1968 (from 42%) did the percentage steadily decline, although it never fell below 30% between 1971 and 1975. Even in 1995 and 2000, the last time such polls were taken, 22% and 24% of Americans did not think the Vietnam War was a mistake.

Although Australia is not a nuclear power, its army was involved in the Vietnam War, and the proportion who supported the war never dropped below 50%.

When the U.S. Army went to war in Iraq in March 2003, only a quarter of Americans thought the decision was wrong. Only two-and-a-half years later, their proportion had reached half but still did not exceed 60% until the end of the war. The latest Gallup poll on the subject, conducted in August 2019, seven-and-a-half years after the war ended, showed that Americans’ opinions were split 50%/45% in favor of those who thought the decision to go to war was a mistake.

In late January of this year, the Levada-Center asked respondents a question as close as possible to the one Gallup asked U.S. residents about their attitudes toward the Vietnam and Iraq wars: How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that Russia made a mistake by starting the Special Military Operation (that is how Kremlin names the war) in Ukraine? A quarter said it was a mistake, two-thirds disagreed; one in 10 could offer no opinion on the question.

The highest proportion of those who believe that the beginning of the war was a mistake is registered in Moscow (36%) and in answers of young Russians (18-24 years old) (33%), but even in the capital and among youth, the proportion of opponents of such an assessment is much higher (58% and 59%, respectively). The maximum share of those who believe that the decision to start the war is correct is recorded in the answers of men (73%), people with a higher standard of living (“we can afford durable goods”), and residents of rural areas (70% in both categories).

Although 71% of those surveyed in the same poll said they were confident that Russia would win, I am not inclined to consider this confidence stable. On the one hand, three-fourths of the respondents have a poor understanding of the goals of the war. They are not ready to give a definite assessment of the achievements of the Russian army: 64% of those asked think that some goals have been achieved and some have not, while another 11% were unable to decide on their answer to this question. On the other hand, 65% of those surveyed agreed that Russia is paying too high a price for this war, while less than 30% disagreed.

It will not be surprising to learn that the maximum proportion of those who considered the price of the war too high was recorded in the answers of women (70%), residents of Moscow (70%), and respondents with low incomes (“barely enough to eat”) (71%). But entirely unexpected for me was the fact that this opinion was held by the overwhelming majority of the elderly (aged 55 and over) (the same 70%), who are commonly referred to as “Putin’s core electorate” and who declare the most significant support for the war. Also, the thesis that the price of war is too high is supported by a confident majority among those who approve of Putin’s actions as president (61%-31%) and among those who believe that the country is heading in the right direction (60%-33%), as well as even among those who do not think that Russia has made a mistake by starting the war (58%-36%).

The maximum proportion of those who disagree with the statement that the price of the war is too high is recorded in the answers of men (35%) and respondents with a higher standard of living (37%)— that is, in those groups who consider the decision to start the war correctly. However, in both groups, their opponents, who agree with the statement that the price of the war is too high, are in the majority (58% and 56%, respectively).

The main conclusions that I can draw from these results are:

1) Nothing is surprising about the fact that the overall level of Russian support for the war is at levels above 60%. At the outset, support for the U.S. wars in Vietnam and Iraq was at similar levels.

2) Russians do not understand the goals of the war and are skeptical of the success of the Russian army.

3) The realization that Russia is paying too high a price for the war in Ukraine dominates the public consciousness, and it is to be expected that this viewpoint will only intensify.

P.S. Nothing said above should be taken as an excuse for the position of Russians who support the war in one way or another.

P.P.S. I am well aware of all the criticisms of the results of sociological surveys under a rigid authoritarian regime. But, on the one hand, sociological surveys (as well as Rosstat data) cannot be replaced. On the other hand, to understand the situation, it is much more important to see trends (changes in an indicator in dynamics) than to get the absolute value of any indicator at one point.