The next morning
January 7, 2022
What happens in Kazakhstan plays a much more critical role in determining Russia’s situation.
Why is Kazakhstan important?
Aside from the fact that the transfer of power in Kazakhstan can be seen as a prototype of how it could have happened in Russia (with a lag of 10-15 years due to the age difference between Nazarbayev, 81, and Putin, 69), three things are important to the Kremlin today and will probably be important to Russia forever.
First, this country is a buffer between Russia and China, but more importantly, between Russia and Central Asia. Kazakhstan is a secular state, unlike its southern neighbors, which can and should serve as a barrier to Islamist infiltration into Russia from the Kremlin’s point of view. The length of the border between Russia and Kazakhstan is 7,600 km (5,936 km by land—4,720 and 3,690 miles) (the U.S.-Canada border is 5,525 miles, while that of the U.S. and Mexico is 1,954 miles). In the absence of partnership with the Kazakh authorities, Russia cannot ensure control along the entire length of the border.
Second, Kazakhstan is an essential element of Putin’s economic universe, the Eurasian Economic Union (EurAsEC). Former President Nursultan Nazarbayev was the main initiator of this union, seeing it as a counterweight to China’s growing economic influence. But after the creation of EurAsEC, the Kremlin seized the initiative, and the association became a symbol of the strengthening of Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union. The hypothetical withdrawal of Kazakhstan from EurAsEC cuts off Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan from the common geographical space with Russia. Given that another member of the union, Armenia, has no common border with other EurAsEC members, this organization will shrink to Russia and Belarus.
Third, Kazakhstan has vast oil and gas reserves, occupying 18th place in the world in production (1.65-1.7 mbd, close to Algeria and Angola) and following Russia’s policy fairway in its relations with OPEC. Much of Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon resources are located along the shores of the Caspian Sea or under its waters, and Russia needs to maintain friendly relations with Kazakhstan to form a coordinated position in the negotiations on the delimitation of economic control zones over this water area.
What was it?
In my opinion, the events in Kazakhstan were the result of several factors; once again, the best definition is the term “perfect storm.”
The trigger for what happened is well understood—a two-fold increase in the price of motor gas. Since January 1, Kazakhstan abandoned the state regulation of prices for this type of fuel and switched to 100% sales through electronic trading. On the one hand, strategically, it was the right decision, if you look at it from the point of view of the logic of minimizing the role of the state in the economy. On the other hand, taking into account the growth of world prices of hydrocarbons and the cost of production of motor gas (the average price of electronic trading is 85 tenge/liter), it was clear that retail prices (60 tenge/liter at the end of 2021) will grow by 80%-100%. The Kazakh government could not foresee such economic consequences—most of the heads of economic departments (ministers, their deputies, heads of departments) have a good education, as a rule, received in the western universities. Even under President Nazarbayev, a meritocratic personnel policy was formulated, relying on career officials. It turns out that the government did not expect such strong social protest. Or…?
Already two days after the protests began, the government announced that it would return to regulating motor gas prices, but the protests continued to grow. The other protest-shaping factors came into play at this point. At the very least, I am ready to argue that what happened in Kazakhstan was a manifestation of opposition political sentiment and/or a reflection of society’s desire for democratization. Between 2012 and 2014, Nazarbayev brutalized the situation in Kazakhstan. He suppressed the political opposition, which ceased to exist in an organized form. Moreover, today it is impossible to name politicians who act as opponents of the existing regime, proclaim alternative political slogans and enjoy recognition and support in society. In such a situation, it is possible to talk about the population’s fatigue from many years of rule by an authoritarian leader (Nazarbayev), but not about the rise of the democratic movement.
The critical component of events in the country, in my opinion, was unstable dual power. The formal leader of the country, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, had no control over law enforcement and the army, which remained in the hands of Nazarbayev, who, according to the law, kept the post of the head of the Security Council for life. Nazarbayev’s poor health in recent months resulted in his effective removal from control. He has ceased to act as a “political roof” for his protégés in the government and law enforcement. It is likely that at this point, Tokayev decided to strengthen his power and gain control over the security bloc, while Nazarbayev’s proxies began to think about ousting Tokayev. Mass popular uprisings could be a fertile ground for implementing their plans for both sides. The protests in their initial stage were advantageous and supported by both sides. On the one hand, the slogans “Grandfather, go away!” appeared; on the other hand, some structures of the Committee for National Security (former KGB) and the Interior Ministry did not resist the protesters and allowed them to obtain weapons.
Undoubtedly, at some point, “the protesters” were supported by lovers of easy money, who, seeing the inaction of the police, began to loot stores and offices.
In this scramble for power, President Tokayev proved to be more agile and calculating. Convinced that he could not rely on the domestic forces of law and order and was unsure of the army’s support, he bet on a strong ally, Russia and Putin. His appeal to the Kremlin for military assistance (through the CSTO) was a well-prepared “impromptu” move; it was coordinated with Moscow in advance. The fact is that the treaty on establishing the CSTO allows the invitation of troops of member countries for protection against external aggression. There is no doubt that such an attack does not exist and did not occur. No evidence confirmed President Tokayev’s words about terrorists trained in other countries; likewise, the President of Kazakhstan did not even mention foreign mercenaries. In a comment, no one even tried to pretend that Kazakhstan was an external threat.
The very decision to use the armed forces of the CSTO member states was made after a short discussion between the leaders of the organization, which showed that Putin was ready for this. Last but not least, according to the Russian Constitution (even after massive amendments in 2020), only the Federation Council can authorize the use of Russian troops outside the country. In this case, not only did President Putin not seek such approval, but none of the Russian public politicians mentioned the need for such action. The only comment came from Leonid Kalashnikov, head of the Russian State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, who said, “No, it is not necessary (permission from the Russian Parliament). There is a CSTO charter for this, CSTO special forces; they are in constant readiness, they undergo exercises, including for such situations. The permission of the Duma is not required here.”
However, no one says that the State Duma must give permission. This is the Federation Council’s jurisdiction. It is (not) surprising that a high-ranking Russian politician is unaware of this.