The 23 hours that shook Putin

June 25, 2023

Now that Yevgeny Prigozhin has left the stage, it is possible to summarize what we have seen, which cannot be called final—the consequences of what we witnessed over 23 hours, from 9 p.m. on June 23 to 8 p.m. on June 24, will not fully manifest themselves for some time yet—but which allow us to create a “skeleton” of what happened, on which details and nuances can be pinned in time. So, my seven conclusions.

First. It would be a huge mistake to call what happened an attempted coup or a “snuffbox scenario.” Prigozhin has always positioned himself as Putin’s loyal servant, ready to do his dirty work for him. Sometimes in plain sight, as in Ukraine, and sometimes in total obscurity, as in the countries of Africa. Prigozhin’s whole pathos was directed against Sergey Shoigu and Gerasimov, and the march on Moscow was initiated by him (most likely as a reaction to his inability to get a conversation with Putin; as an alternative conspiracy theory, Prigozhin’s patrons and allies in Putin’s circle could have hinted to him that the President was ready to take his side if only he showed a little more pressure) to convince Putin to replace the two generals. Prigozhin has never questioned Putin’s right to power, and even in reacting to accusations of treason, he has shown loyalty to Putin.

The topic of a potential coup d'état was thrown into the information space by the FSB, which initiated a criminal case under Article 279 of the Russian Criminal Code, “Organization of an armed insurrection or active participation therein to overthrow or forcibly change the constitutional order...” Whether this was done consciously, or in their hurry they failed to assess the situation adequately and select a more appropriate charge, is yet to be determined.

Second. The Prigozhin rebellion has shown that the Putin regime, like any other dictator’s regime, collapses when confronted with military pressure and that even yesterday, its loyal guards proved unable to withstand the organized armed forces that are implementing the most primitive plan—a march to the capital along the main highways.

Third. On the one hand, the Putin government elite is inwardly ready for any turn of events and can turn its back on Putin at any moment. Still, on the other hand, it is not prepared to support an illegitimate change of power until the change becomes evident. Although we have heard the voices of many governors in support of Putin, we have not heard from Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and his ministers, nor FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov, Security Service Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, Presidential Administration Head Anton Vaino or his deputy for domestic policy Sergey Kiriyenko, nor from Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov. Of course, we can suppose that Putin has forbidden them to speak out publicly, but the intent of such a decision is hard to understand. It should be noted, however, that no one among the top 100/200 Russian politicians has publicly supported Prigozhin’s actions.

Fourth. Popular support for Putin immediately evaporated, at least in Rostov. Although he remained the incumbent president, no one took to the streets to show even minor respect for a person who considered himself a legitimate state leader.

Fifth. The Kremlin has indeed won an important tactical victory by removing Prigozhin from the Russian scene—it is impossible to call his departure for Belarus otherwise. Apparently, Prigozhin did not receive any payoffs, except for the closure of criminal cases against him and the Wagner fighters who took part in the campaign against Moscow (however, all these cases can be reopened at any time), and Alexander Lukashenko made him an offer that Prigozhin could not refuse. Whether it was a collection of dirt that Prigozhin preferred not to make public, a list of his assets abroad that Russia was ready to hand over to the American administration, or a list of hostages among the relatives and friends of the Wagner commanders who were detained by the Russian special services is not at all important. At least as far as the army is concerned, the Kremlin has restored its monopoly.

Sixth. The events of June 23-24 demonstrated in all their glory the results of the adverse cadre selection, among both those who are supposed to protect Putin and those on whom Putin relies. If Prigozhin, who was Putin’s errand boy for many years, could get out of control and start playing at destroying things, then the same can be expected from other of Putin’s errand boys. Suppose none of Putin’s inner circle of officials is prepared to stand up for the President, who is legitimate from their point of view. In that case, obviously, no one will come to his aid in the ensuing critical situation.

Seventh. Unsuccessful coups strengthen the position of the current dictator and prolong his stay in power. So don’t be surprised if we see a lot of discussion on state TV about how quickly and without bloodshed the uprising was crushed and how the attempted coup d'état was averted. But we should also be prepared for a new wave of tightening of the screws—Putin saw with his own eyes the fragility of his power. Hence, he needs to increase efforts to identify and punish internal enemies. Returning to my first thesis that there was no attempt at a coup d'état, all of these efforts are unlikely to make Putin's regime any more muscular—its weaknesses, which the whole world saw, became too obvious. It turns out an interesting paradox: Although Prigozhin did not want to eliminate Putin and liquidate his regime, his actions seriously weakened the political structure and forever deprived Putin of a peaceful sleep—if before his fears of a coup were paranoid but not based on anything, now there is a solid foundation under them.

PS. For Western readers. The main lesson for the West after Prigozhin's escapade: Putin, president of Russia, guarantees its instability and unpredictability.